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Abstract 
Over the last decade, there has been an increasing body of work that explores 
whether sensory and motor information is a necessary part of semantic 
representation and processing.  This is the embodiment hypothesis.  This paper 
presents a theoretical review of this work that is intended to be useful for 
researchers in the neurosciences and neuropsychology.  Beginning with a historical 
perspective, relevant theories are placed on a continuum from strongly embodied to 
completely unembodied representations.  Predictions are derived and neuroscientific 
and neuropsychological evidence that could support different theories is reviewed; 
finally, criticisms of embodiment are discussed.  We conclude that strongly embodied 
and completely disembodied theories are not supported, and that the remaining 
theories agree that semantic representation involves some form of Convergence 
Zones (Damasio, 1989) and the activation of modal content.  For the future, 
research must carefully define the boundaries of semantic processing and tackle the 
representation of abstract entities and elements in language. 
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Introduction  
Cognitive embodiment – the hypothesis that cognitive processes of all kinds are 
rooted in perception and action - has been keenly taken up by numerous researchers 
in language and cognition.  The last ten years has seen a growth in the number of 
theories within psycholinguistics and the neuroscience of language that have some 
element of embodiment.  In this paper, we review theories that make some explicit 
statement about the presence (or absence) of sensory and motor information in 
single word meaning.  This review is not intended to be exhaustive.  We assume that 
there is some cognitive information that can be classified as the semantic 
representation of an individual word, and it is these representations that we are 
concerned with.  Therefore, we include only those theories that make some explicit 
reference to the representation of word-meaning, either in the methodologies used in 
support of the theories (e.g. naming, modelling using verbal labels) or in the 
explication of the theory itself.   
The theories will be placed on a continuum from strongly embodied ‘full simulation’ 
to un-embodied, ‘fully symbolic’ systems.  This is intended as a position paper, and 
we will argue that the extreme ends of the continuum are without substantial 
support.  We will discuss the evidence that is needed to support or refute the 
theories in the center of the continuum.  The review also seeks to establish a clear 
link between theories in psycholinguistics and theories in neuroscience as they 
substantially overlap in their cognitive and neural predictions for semantic 
representation.  We will begin by recapping the principle ideas that underpin 
embodied and non-embodied (classic) cognitive approaches; this serves to clarify 
how theoretical positions differ and where the battle lines are drawn. 
 
 3
Do symbols need bodies? A brief history.  
Early cognitive science adopted a symbol processing approach.  This was heavily 
influenced by predicate logic, propositional and computational formalisms (Fodor, 
1983; Johnson-Laird, 1993; Simon, 1979; Pylyshyn, 1985) and computation was 
viewed as an incredibly powerful tool through which to study cognition (Johnson-
Laird, 1993).  The idea of cognition-as-symbol manipulation provided a means to 
precisely define and separate psychological processes. 'Cognitive symbols' designate 
external events and objects, but their nature as internal entities is the same no 
matter what they symbolize. This internal consistency allows processing to be 
determined by cognitive architecture (Newell & Simon, p.29) rather than by what the 
symbols represent in the external world.  The structure of the processor is more 
important than the content of symbols it manipulates; symbols don’t change but 
processes that create, interpret and manipulate symbols do. Similarly, in computing, 
binary representation in the form of zeros and ones is able to represent whatever is 
required, but the real trick is in the processing that manipulates that binary code to 
do everything from emails to touching up photographs.  In this framework, a theory 
of semantic representation needs to define how words (as symbols) are processed 
and related to one another, not how they are able to refer to things in the world and 
not what they are composed of (a symbol has no content, it is a designation).  
Symbolic cognition can only be achieved if sensory and motor information is 
transformed into a qualitatively different format (Pylyshyn, 1985).  This 
transformation is termed transduction, literally transforming from one information 
type (signal) into another (symbol) so that it can be manipulated by cognitive 
processes.  It is not clear whether this transformation is reversible, i.e. once a 
cognitive symbol has been established, is the path of the transformation lost? The 
transformation separates the levels at which cognitive symbols are manipulated (a 
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symbol processing level) and at which transduction takes place (some prior 
'representational' level) (ibid).  Thus, how an internal representation does designate 
an external entity is sidelined in favour of defining higher order symbolic processes 
themselves. This is a non-trivial choice, since it allows theories of conceptual and 
semantic representation to provide symbolic labels for concepts and semantic units, 
without having to define exactly what it’s meaningful content might be.  However, 
the system must be semantically constrained: what the symbol means has an 
influence on processing (Pylyshyn, 1985).  If it were not, we would constantly see 
"semantically deviant" behaviours (ibid, p.36), for example, '1 + 1' would produce 
the answer 'cheese'.   Therefore, cognitive symbols must have consistent and 
singular reference; i.e. one semantic interpretation. This is unlike true symbolism in 
which a symbol 'X' can refer to 'cat', 'blue' or 'Wednesday'.  Basic, primitive, 
cognitive symbols cannot take this form and there must be a causal link between 
cognitive functions and what is represented, otherwise any symbolic explanation is 
"gratuitous" (Pylyshyn, 1985, p.43).  The thorny problem of how symbolic 
representations refer to things in the world was explicitly recognized (Fodor, 1987; 
Pylyshyn, 1985; Newell, 1980) but never explained within the symbolic framework.  
Determining the organization of cognitive processes was more important than 
establishing its content. 
It is the murky process of transduction that forms the crux of the argument against 
symbolic cognition, termed the 'symbol grounding problem' (Harnad, 1990; Vogt, 
2002).  This is best illustrated by the Chinese Room Argument (Searle, 1980), a 
thought experiment in which an English speaker in a closed room receives Chinese 
symbols through a hatch and returns other Chinese characters according to strict 
rules, without ever knowing the meaning of the character strings.  If symbols are not 
causally linked to their referents (the person in the room does not know what the 
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symbols mean), internal manipulation of those symbols is never enough to establish 
meaning (the person will never know what messages are communicated).    
Under the symbolic description, the mental world builds a model of the external 
world by transducing perceptual input (Clark, 1997).  Under the embodied approach, 
there is only limited modeling of the external world and cognition is about real world 
action rather than symbolic representation (Clark, 1997; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 
1991).  Embodied approaches can be anti-representationalist, rejecting entirely the 
notion that cognition needs or uses representations of the outside world (Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch, 1991).  However, without the capacity for context independent 
representation and symbolism of some form, semantics is not possible.  This is 
because semantics allows an arbitrary form (the sound of a word or a visual sign) to 
consistently refer to some entity or concept (it's meaning), whether or not that entity 
is present in the immediate environment (e.g. a cup of coffee), imaginary (e.g. a 
unicorn) or tangible (e.g. truth, beauty, liberty).  This means that cognition must be 
able to (a) represent or at least refer things without them being present and (b) 
represent or refer to things that have never been tangibly experienced.  Both the 
arbitrary relationship between a word-form and its meaning and the capacity for a 
lexical item to stand for a referent are essentially, philosophically, symbolic 
capacities.  Therefore, we assume that embodied theories of semantics accept the 
proposal that if on-line cognition (e.g. drinking a cup of coffee) is intimately 
connected to perception and action, in order to maintain a coherent system off-line 
cognition should also be embodied (i.e. thinking about drinking a cup of coffee).  In 
other words, off-line cognition will depend upon perceptual and motor systems.  For 
example, the problem of designation can be partially solved by pushing the world 
inside the mind, what Jackendoff (2002) terms the 'mentalistic enterprise' (see 
Lakoff, 1987 and Frith, 2007, for a similar view).  The mind constructs "cognitive 
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structures in response to inputs from the senses" (Jackendoff, p.299) which form the 
basis of conceptual representation.  There is no longer a need to refer to things 
‘outside’ the mind, because the world is constructed by the mind in response to 
experiential input – sensory and motor information.     
How can a system which is intimately tied to real-world action and dynamic, on-line, 
processes have stable representations?  The answer may be through simulation:     
"In general, the function of these sensory-motor resources is to run a simulation of 
some aspect of the physical world, as a means of representing information or 
drawing inferences." (Wilson, 2002, p.633).  
On experiencing a thing, like a cup of coffee, we have various sensory (taste, smell, 
touch) and motor (drinking) experiences. When we hear the words "cup of coffee", 
embodiment states that we re-construct in some form that sensory and motor 
information.  Embodiment focuses on the content of cognitive representations and 
from that derives organizational principles.  
The environment has to be internalised somehow, but instead of transducing the 
signal into a symbolic format, the signal is recreated.  This claim is the most relevant 
for our purposes, since it directly links to semantic representation and it translates 
into a simple statement:  
The content of semantic representation is sensory and motor information.  
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Theories of Semantics 
In line with symbol processing, early theories of semantic representation focused on 
how words are related to each-other; i.e., how the semantic system is organized 
(e.g. Quillian, 1968; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Levelt, 1989). For example, lexical items 
might be holistic nodes in a connected network (Quillian, Collins & Loftus, 1975), or 
emerge from a collection of features or attributes (Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974).  
More recently, attributive features, such as “red”, “sweet” and “round” for ‘cherry’, 
have provided the basis for semantic similarity and the grouping of lexical items 
(Farah & McClelland, 1991; McRae, de Sa, Seidenberg, 1997; Tyler & Moss, 2001; 
Jackendoff, 2002; Vigliocco, Vinson, Lewis & Garrett, 2004; Rogers et al, 2004).  As 
well as attributive features, statistics of co-occurance (distributive information) have 
also been put forward.  This information links words which appear in the same 
contexts, like ‘bank’ appearing in the same paragraph as ‘bonus’, and words that 
appear together and are lexicaly associated like ‘cat and mouse’ (Landauer & 
Dumais, 1997; Vigliocco et al, 2008; Simmons, Hamann et al, 2008).   
For theories of semantics, the focus on the organisation has been successful. 
Theories of semantics have proposed explanations for extant empirical findings from 
semantic priming or interference paradigms, and patterns of semantic impairments 
in neuropsychological studies.  However, until recently it has meant that the question 
of semantic content, i.e. what is the 'stuff' of semantics, has been partly neglected.  
It is no longer enough to propose that attributive features such as “red”, “round” 
and  “sweet” make up the semantic representation of the word ‘cherry’; what is the 
nature of the feature “red”?  The way this question is answered can be understood 
by placing theories on a continuum; this separates out what assumptions are made 
about the content of semantic representations.  Degree of embodiment is used as 
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the primary classification, from symbolic/amodal to analogue/multimodal; producing 
four categories (see ‘Label’ on the continuum).   
A number of other parameters parallel this classification and are important when 
considering what predictions the theories make.  'Relationship to sensory-motor 
systems' defines the degree of dependence or independence that semantic content 
has from sensory and motor information.  'Explanation of interactions' refers to how 
theories explain the now large body of evidence that shows interactions between the 
processing of semantic content and sensory-motor information.  ‘Neural 
implementation’ defines how these theories would look in the brain (some make 
explicit neuroscientific predictions and others do not).  Note that it is not simply a 
case of all-or-nothing embodiment.   
 
 
---------------------------- Insert Figure 1 about here ------------------------------  
 
 
Un-embodied theories  
These theories posit no role for sensory and motor information in semantic 
representation.  Semantic information is truly symbolic and there is an arbitrary 
relationship between the format in which semantic information is represented when 
compared to the information to which it refers.  As in the classic cognitive approach, 
the emphasis is on the organisation of the system. Semantic information is 
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completely independent from sensory and motor systems, so it predicts no 
impairments in semantic processing if sensory and motor systems are disrupted.  
Any interactions between semantic content and sensory-motor systems are 
explained by an indirect route, for example, semantic information affects working 
memory processes which may then engage sensory and motor capacities.  There is 
no direct route through which semantic information contacts sensory and motor 
information.  Neurally, we might expect there to be no temporal or topographical 
overlap between areas that respond to semantic tasks and areas that respond to 
sensory and motor information.   
For Levelt (1989), language must be propositional, i.e. symbolic, and the preverbal 
message initiates the activation of specific lexical items that are holistic, symbolic 
lexical representations (lemmas), which are selected from the lexicon.  In Latent 
Semantic Analysis (LSA, Landauer & Dumais, 1997) the meaning of a word is defined 
by its relation to other words, rather than by what it refers to.  Thus the meaning of 
a word is defined as a set of abstracted symbols (vectors). This is similar to the early 
network models (Quillian, 1968; Collins & Loftus, 1975) which define similarity as 
associations between individual items; LSA represents these associations as 
probabilities of co-occurrence in text.   
 
Secondary embodiment  
These theories propose that the format of semantic representations is amodal, i.e. 
modality invariant, but they do not go so far as to introduce a hard boundary 
between semantic representation and sensory and motor content.  There is a non-
arbitrary relationship between semantic representations and sensory-motor content.  
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For Patterson, Rogers and colleagues this is because amodal semantic 
representations are derived from mappings across sensory and motor input.  For 
Mahon & Carmazza it is because amodal conceptual representations are instantiated 
by retrieving sensory and motor information. For Quillian, it is because the properties 
that make up semantic content are likely to be taken from the same store that 
supports perception.  In all cases, we can say that the semantic system is 
independent of but directly associated with sensory and motor information; thus we 
might expect some mild impairment when sensory and motor information is 
disrupted, but this would be minor in comparison to disruption of the amodal, 
abstract semantic system 'proper'.  Note here the difficulty in quantitatively defining 
mild, moderate and severe disruption (see below for our attempt at doing this).  
Interactions between semantics and sensory motor information are explained via the 
non-arbitrary, associative connections.  The activity of modality specific systems that 
process sensory and motor information is altered by to the connections that mediate 
between semantic and sensory and motor information; thus interactions are 
explained by mediation.  Neurally, there may be one location that serves as a 
semantic hub in combination with distributed sensory and motor locations (Rogers et 
al, 2004; Patterson et al, 2008).   
Patterson, Rogers and colleagues (2004, 2007) propose that the anterior temporal 
lobes provide the location for a semantic system which maps between modality-
specific information from different domains – it is not clear whether this mapping is 
reciprocal or unilateral.  As such it does not "code explicit semantic content" (Rogers 
et al, p.206) as it abstracts away from modality specific attributes.  These attributes 
are represented in a widely distributed network of modality specific cortical regions, 
such as the motor and visual cortices.  Mahon & Caramazza (2008) propose that 
semantic content is 'grounded by interaction' with sensory and motor information.  
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Here, all concepts are represented at an abstract, amodal level not constituted by 
sensory and motor information, but when a specific instance of a concept is realised 
there follows the passive activation of specific sensory and motor information.  
Therefore, the disruption of sensory and motor information results in "impoverished 
or 'isolated' concepts".  Interactions are explained away by “spreading activation” 
from abstract representations to modality specific input, due to non-arbitrary 
connections (which must be reciprocal for spreading activation to occur) between 
semantic representations and the sensory and motor experiences they are derived 
from.  At the least, this relegates activity in modality specific areas to being 
functionally inconsequential as it results from the 'bleeding' of activity from 
elsewhere.  At best, spreading activation makes modality specific activity secondary 
to the essential amodal semantic information; with a functional role only when an 
amodal concept has been instantiated.  We will return to this point later. 
 
Weak embodiment  
This group of theories propose that semantic representations are at least partly 
constituted by sensory-motor information.  Any sensory or motor information that is 
activated when semantic processing takes place is contentfull, namely it has a 
representational role, rather than being accessed secondary to abstract information 
that is considered 'true' semantics (as above).  One consequence of this is that a 
certain degree of abstraction takes place within that sensory and motor information 
itelf.  Integration of features within and between modalities produces more holistic 
representations that we might expect to be neurally located adjacent to modality 
specific cortical areas which process the experience of the represented entities.  This 
is most clearly spelled out in Simmons & Barsalou (2003), but a similar idea is 
presented and modelled in Vigliocco et al (2004).  As sensory and motor information 
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has a representational role, there is a partial dependence on sensory and motor 
sytems, although not on primary cortical regions.  Interaction effects between word 
processing and perception/action are explained by mediation of a stronger form.  
Semantic processing involves areas adjacent to and reciprocally linked to primary 
sensory and motor areas. Activation of semantic content will be able to influence 
processing in primary areas, and vice versa, through those links.  Interactions may 
be more or less potent depending on the strength, number and activity of the 
connections; and may be influenced by task demands (e.g. top-down influences from 
attention that strengthen the influence on primary sensory and motor processing, by 
making particular task stimuli more salient).    
Farah & McClelland (1991) defined representations as patterns of activation across 
‘visual’ and ‘functional’ input units. Visual inputs encode visual features, e.g. colour 
and shape, whereas functional inputs encoded ‘use’ information, e.g. that mice are 
kept as pets or that a broom is used to sweep. The content of semantic 
representation is cross-modal, with combinations of features from different 
modalities aggregated into semantic representations for particular entities (in this 
case objects).   The Featural and Unitary Semantic Space hypothesis (FUSS, 
Vigliocco, Vinson, Lewis & Garrett, 2004) assumes that conceptual structure is 
organized by feature type, such as those that are modality specific (visual, motor 
etc.). A separate semantic level is derived from conceptual structure as features are 
bound together into lexico-semantic representations; these supervene over the 
individual features that define them but they are at least partly grounded in sensory 
and motor representations.  Simmons and Barsalou (2003) more explicitly extend 
Damasio's Convergance Zone theory (CZ) with the Similarity in Topography (SIT) 
principle.  See Plaut (2002) for a similar computational approach that models 
semantic representations with “a graded degree of modality specificity” (p. 613, ibid) 
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that depend on their proximity to modality specific regions.  Neurons in early sensory 
and motor cortices respond to modality specific features, and higher order 
'convergance zones' in association cortices respond to patterns of these features for 
a particular input (e.g. the visual input from seeing a cat).  For Damasio (1989), CZs 
do not perform a representational role, but act to re-instate patterns of activity in 
lower CZs when representation is required.  Representation is therefore not possible 
without both higher and lower order CZs.  Simmons & Barsalou (2003) instead 
propose that patterns of activity in higher order CZs do act as stand-alone 
representations; so damage to lower CZs would not remove the capacity for 
representation.  The additional SIT principle allows semantic structure to be derived 
from the cortical representation of sensory and motor information.  Featural 
similarities are reproduced topographically such that "The spatial proximity of two 
neurons in a CZ reflects the similarity of the features they conjoin.” (ibid, p.457).   
There are then two theories which can be classified as both weak and/or strong 
embodiment, we note here that the predictions are not mutually exclusive: it 
depends where one draws the line at what is considered to be semantic processing.  
It should be becoming clear that as we move from abstract/symbolic theories to 
strong versions of embodiment, the scope of what is considered semantic widens to 
include more and more sensory and motor processing, until we end up with 'full 
simulation' being necessary for semantics.  
Pulvermüller (1999) proposed a neurally motivated account of word meaning, 
grounded in  Hebbian learning.   Assemblies of neural populations in distinct cortical 
areas act together to achieve representation, producing distributed networks of co-
activated regions.  Activation is defined spatio-temporally across participating cortical 
regions.  For semantics, the essential process is the association of areas relating to 
the word form with areas relating to the perceptions and actions to which the word 
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refers.  Coactivated neurons "develop into a higher-order assembly" (p.260, 1999).  
Areas within an assembly show stimulus specificity only if other areas of the 
assembly are intact (Pulvermüller, 2001), suggesting that the representations are 
not robust given damage in one part of the assembly – if true, the theory is strongly 
embodied as representation is dependent on sensory and motor information.    
Using a nominal twist on the classically symbolic Physical Symbol Systems (Newell, 
1980), the Perceptual Symbol Systems (PcSS) account is the most wide-ranging 
theory of how simulation might drive human cognition (Barsalou, 1999). Perceptual 
Symbols (PcS) are based in the sensory and motor neural systems that are active 
when a percept is experienced.  Complete neural activations generated by perceiving 
a particular entity are not recreated, rather, attentionally selected elements of that 
activation are produced: "the symbol formation process selects and stores a subset 
of the active neurons in a perceptual state" (Barsalou, 1999, p.584).  For lexical 
items, a simulation instantiates the word, varying according to the sentential 
context: "As comprehension proceeds, representations of individuals develop, as in 
the perception of a physical scene." (Barsalou, 1999, p.605).  Therefore, on the one 
hand we have abstracted information (a subset of a perceptual state) that could be 
classed as weakly embodied and simulation during comprehension that could be 
classed as strongly embodied.  
 
Strong embodiment  
In strong embodiment, low level sensory and motor information is activated in 
primary cortical areas as part of routine semantic processing.  This effectively pushes 
semantics out into primary cortical areas and makes it completely dependent on 
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sensory and motor systems.  Interactions are no longer explained by mediation, i.e. 
semantic information influencing early sensory and motor processing from 'the 
outside'.  Instead, sensory and motor systems are directly modulated by semantic 
processing, since they are used to represent semantic content during 'simulation'.  
Note that Zwaan (2004) and Glenberg and colleagues (2000; 2003) are more 
directly concerned with narrative comprehension, which lends itself to the 
construction of situation models and fits intuitively with simulation.  These theories 
all subscribe to what we will call 'full simulation': the re-creation of direct experience 
through the modulation of activity in primary sensory and motor areas.  Semantics 
uses the same resources as sensory motor processing, and they are essentially 
isomorphic.  Recall that both Pulvermüller (2001) and Barsalou (1999) are also 
compatible with strong embodiment.  
One of the strongest formulations of embodied semantic representation comes from 
Gallese & Lakoff (2005).  This theory proposes a neural account of how embodied 
content underpins conceptual representation.  The same neural substrates are used 
for perceiving/doing, imagining and linguistic understanding.  The authors define 
functional clusters which perform multi-modal integration within a given modal area 
– rather than having cross-modal integration in association areas outside primary 
modal areas (as for CZs and weak embodiment).  Functional clusters perform action 
simulations to achieve representation.  Thus, representations are organized by the 
structure of sensory and motor systems and exhausted by them.   
Zwaan’s (2004) Immersed Experiencer Framework (IEF) is a comprehensive theory 
of how embodied processes might work during language comprehension.  
Comprehension involves the simulation of whatever the language describes, and this 
simulation necessarily recruits sensory and motor representations.  The IEF offers a 
detailed account of the comprehension process, stressing the 'vicarious experience' 
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that is the product of comprehension.  Perceptual and motor representations are 
necessary since comprehension is proposed to be the "reconstruction of an 
experience with its referent [that requires the] integration and sequencing of traces 
from actual experience cued by the linguistic input" (p.38).   
The indexical hypothesis (Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003) 
seeks to link language, and specifically semantics, to the preparation of action within 
the environment.  The theory proposes that "the meaning of a situation to an 
individual consists of set of potential actions available to that individual in that 
situation" (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003, p.100), these are termed affordances.  Words 
are Indexed to objects in the environment or to perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 
1999), which stand for real world objects.  Affordances are then derived from the 
perceptual symbols, which lend themselves easily to this since they simulate the 
situation described in the sentence, necessarily recruiting sensory and motor 
information in a context dependent way.  A simulation of the situation is performed 
and this is how comprehension is possible.  It is not completely clear whether these 
theories assume strong embodiment as the lexical level; it is interesting to note that 
strong embodiment appears more intuitive as soon as we move outside the lexicon, 
and towards mental models and imagery. 
 
Summary  
We have placed theories of semantic representation on a continuum from 'fully 
symbolic' to 'full simulation'.  It is true that within the neuroscientific literature - 
sensory and motor cortices are routinely activated during semantic processing of 
concrete objects and actions but whether this constit
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not has not been explicitly debated (see below) (Martin, 2007; Patterson et al, 2008; 
Thompson-Schill, 2003).  Alongside growing behavioural evidence of interactions 
between language and sensory and motor processes (see Meteyard & Vigliocco, 
2008), we feel it is reasonable to reject the extreme left of the continuum 
representing ‘fully symbolic’ semantics.  Thus, in the remaining sections of the paper 
we focus on discussing secondary, weak and strong embodiment.  
The controversy between symbolic vs. embodied views as discussed in cognitive 
science also encompasses the opposition between unitary vs. multiple semantic 
systems as discussed in cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology.  Since 
cognitive and psycholinguistic theory has taken on board embodied proposals, the 
theoretical debates can be joined to those in neuroscience.  In neuroscience, unitary 
versus multiple semantic systems have been opposed.  A unitary semantic system is 
one in which the same set of representations are used across all modalities of input 
and output, and supervene over different kinds of sensory and motor information 
(Caramazza, Hillis, Rapp, & Romani, 1990; Lambon Ralph, Graham, Patterson, & 
Hodges, 1999; Patterson et al, 2007; Plaut, 2002; Rapp, Hillis, & Caramazza, 1993).  
This is similar to fully symbolic, or derived embodiment, as representations are 
essentially abstracted from a particular input or information type.  The neural 
predictions are therefore similar to those for the left hand side of the continuum.  For 
example, the anterior temporal regions orchestrate semantic representation by 
mapping across all modalities (Patterson et al, 2008; Bright, Moss & Tyler, 2004). 
In contrast to this, multiple semantics states that several sub-systems are 
distributed across cortical regions, and organized by input modality, sensory and 
motor attributes or category relationships.  A ‘complete’ representation would be 
defined across all of these sub-systems, and different parts might be more or less 
recruited depending on the task (e.g. shape judgment versus category judgment) 
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(Paivio, 1971; 1986; Warrington & Shallice, 1984; Thompson-Schill et al, 2003; 
Martin, 2007).  This is similar to weak embodiment as representations are located 
adjacent or close to the sensory and motor content from which they are derived.  
The neural predictions are therefore similar and predict distributed, modality specific 
regions. For example, ventral temporal regions represent colour and form, left lateral 
temporal regions for motion and parietal regions for size (Thompson-Schill et al, 
2003).  Neuroscientific theories do not conform to strongly embodied ideas, some 
degree of abstraction from primary regions is assumed, and across all theories it is 
recognized that higher order conjunctions must be extracted for conceptual 
representation to begin (e.g. those that constitute shape, size or motion), and that 
this process of abstraction and feature conjunction is especially evident for objects in 
the ventral temporal stream (e.g. Bright, Moss & Tyler, 2004; Barense et al, 2005).   
 
Deciding between theories: hypotheses and evidence 
Secondary, weak and strong embodiment can be distinguished on the basis of 
imaging and patient data.  
Imaging Data. 
Strong embodiment predicts activation of primary sensory and motor cortices across 
all semantic tasks.  
Strong embodiment proposes 'full simulation' - the re-enactment of sensory and 
motor activations (to a greater or lesser degree) produced during real experience.  
Thus, these theories predict that primary sensory and motor cortices should be 
engaged during semantic processing, since these areas process the raw stuff of 
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experience.  Neither weak nor secondary/derived embodiment theories subscribe to 
this prediction.  
Weakly embodied theories specifically predict activation of areas anterior or adjacent 
to primary sensory and motor cortices across all semantic tasks for words with 
sensory and motor content. This shaprply contrasts with the predicitons of secondary 
embodiment according to which we should observe activation across all semantic 
tasks of cortical regions that (a) do not overlap with areas known to process sensory 
and motor information and (b) cannot be interpreted as performing other functions 
implicated in a task, as we shall discuss in more detail below. 
Weak embodiment proposes that modality specific activations should be adjacent, or 
anterior to primary sensory or motor cortices that process real experience.  This 
evidence goes against strong embodiment as it does not follow 'full simulation' (see 
above) and against secondary/derived embodiment as it implies a representational 
role for sensory and motor information.  Semantic information could be reliant on 
association areas that integrate modal information and abstract away from ‘raw’ 
information processed in the primary sensory and motor cortices, rather than 
semantic processing directly requiring the primary cortices themselves.  
Distinct modal information could be integrated within the modal areas themselves, 
rather than requiring a separate association area, as proposed by Damasio (1989) 
and expanded by Simmons & Barsalou (2003, see also Kemmerer, 2009).  For 
example, Gallese & Lakoff (2005) cite evidence from monkey studies which show 
neurons in premotor areas selectively responding to motor, visual and 
somatosensory information for the purpose of controlling movements in peripersonal 
space.  However, this does not preclude the possibility of separate (but proximal) 
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areas that perform feature conjunctions and cross-modal integration for the 
purposes of semantic representation. 
An interesting phenomena that may shed some light on this is the 'anterior shift' 
noted by Thompson-Schill (2003) and explored alongside other cortical gradients 
(e.g. ventral-dorsal) by Chatterjee (2008, 2010). This is the finding that the areas 
activated by semantic processing are not iso-morphic to those used in direct 
experience, but are shifted anterior to those areas.  For example, Martin, Wiggs et al 
(Nature, 1996) find that for animals versus tools, there are various areas close to, 
but not identical with, areas used in perception and action. Other examples can be 
found in Wallentin et al (2005) who found an area anterior to MT/V5 active for 
sentences that described actual and fictive motion (for a wider review see also 
Chatterjee, 2010) and Willems et al (2009, 2010) who find activity in pre-motor, not 
primary motor, cortices for action understanding.  
 
The anterior shift supports the proposals from weak embodiment that sensory motor 
information may be abstracted from direct experience, rather than a simulation of it.  
The possibility of moving away from simulation as an explanatory mechanism is 
interesting, and it is also in line with findings from the neuroscience of conceptual 
processing.  It does not require a move away from modality specific information, the 
central idea being that there is a move from simple features conjunctions, for 
example within one modality, to more complex conjunctions that could cross 
modalities (e.g. Acres, 2008; Damasio, 1989; Murray & Bussey, 1999; Lerner et al, 
2001) and represent more schematic and abstract information (Chatterjee, 2010).  
Modality specific activations claimed by strong embodiment to be a 'simulation' may 
instead be the activation of feature conjunctions sufficient to represent a given 
object, or word.  For example, Bar et al (2001) found that activity in the ventral 
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stream was more anterior when participants recognised very briefly presented object 
pictures, as compared to percieving a shape without object recognition.  If we 
progress down this route, attractive because of the converging evidence, it is 
questionable whether the simulation of real experience is necessary for semantic 
representation (see also work by Tyler and colleagues on object concepts, e.g. Tyler 
et al, 2004; Taylor, Stamatakis & Tyler, 2009). 
Patterson and colleagues (e.g., Patterson et al., 2008) put forward an anatomically 
defined theory that falls under secondary/derived embodiment.  Their clear proposal 
is that the amodal semantic system is localized in anterior temporal areas. Such 
localization is inferred primarily on the basis of the anatomo-behavioural correlations 
observed in patients suffering from semantic dementia (SD, e.g. Jeffries, Patterson, 
Jones & Lambon-Ralph, 2009).  Until recently, functional imaging of the regions 
around the anterior temporal lobes (ATLs) has been hindered by signal drop out (e.g. 
Schwarzbauer et al, 2009; Devlin et al, 2000), but other techniques, such as 
repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS) have produced converging 
evidence for the role of the ATLs in semantic processing for concrete and abstract 
words (Pobric, Lambon-Ralph & Jeffries, 2009).  However, the potentially diffuse 
damage in SD and changed activity in distal regions connected to the ATLs in rTMS, 
mean that the ATLs may not be the stand-alone region dedicated to semantic and 
conceptual representation; especially when considering evidence that implicates the 
ATLs in the representation of unique entities and social/affective knowledge 
(Simmons & Martin, 2009).    
To recap, secondary/derived embodiment states that the core of semantic 
representation is some abstract, amodal information.  It is connected to sensory and 
motor information which may then be activated when particular concepts are 
instantiated or because activation spreads in a functionally unimportant way (Mahon 
 22
& Caramazza, 2008).  This means that ‘true’ semantic activation in the brain cannot 
overlap with sensory and motor cortices (see above).  It also means that activations 
that appear across semantic tasks must be carefully teased apart to separate those 
areas that are active because they represent semantic information, and those areas 
that are active because they perform some task related control function, such as 
lexical selection.  For example, Corbett, Jeffries, Ehsan and Lambon-Ralph (2009) 
argued that the performance of patients with semantic dementia (with damage to 
the anterior temporal lobes) reflects a central impairment of amodal semantic 
representations, whereas the performance of patients with semantic aphasic deficits 
following stroke (with damage to temporo-parietal and frontal regions) reflects 
damage to control processes.  Control mechanisms might be those proposed by 
Schnur and colleagues (2009), who argue that Broca’s area – a region routinely 
active in language tasks of all kinds - is involved in selecting amongst competing 
representations.   
Related to these issues are the arguments that certain cortical regions, considered to 
process sensory or motor information, actually represent/process more abstract and 
potentially grammatical information.  For example, Bedny et al (2008) argued that 
activations for verbs versus nouns in the posterior-lateral-temporal cortex reflected 
event concepts (i.e. an abstract category for verbs) rather than sensory information 
related to visual or motion attributes.  The fact that activations around are MT for 
verbs appear to be proximal but not identical to those areas involved in motion 
processing is dealt with in more detail below (and see Chatterjee, 2010).      
In sum, the imaging data can at present be taken to support either weak 
embodiment, with some form of distributed convergence zones that represent 
modality specific information and provide semantic content, or derived/secondary 
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embodiment, with an independent region or region(s) that represent abstract, 
amodal information that is derived from sensory and motor regions.   
 
Lexico-semantics, narrative and imagery   
Two of the theories that we have classed as strongly embodied refer to sentential 
and narrative level processes (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003; Zwaan, 2004), it is 
possible that different amounts of sensory and motor information are recruited 
depending on the depth of semantic processing that is required for a task.  One 
difficulty lies in defining what counts as semantic processing and what counts as 
deeper, or more 'explicit' processes.  Even within language processing there are 
likely to be differences between single word, sentence and narrative comprehension 
(e.g. Zwaan, 2004).  Evidence has been put forward that sensory and motor 
information is not accessed when judgments can be made on the basis of lexical 
associations alone (e.g. Simmons et al, 2008).  However, evidence in support of 
strong and weak embodiment demonstrates the involvement of sensory and motor 
information at the single word level for passive comprehension tasks (e.g. Meteyard 
et al, 2008; Pulvermüller, Harle & Hummel, 2001).   
There is evidence that primary regions involved in perception are engaged during 
imagery tasks (e.g. Kossyln, Thompson, Kim & Alpert, 2000).  If we assume that 
narrative comprehension comes closer to conscious imagery than single word or 
sentence comprehension, it is not surprising to find evidence that areas involved in 
navigation (hippocampal and parahippocampal regions) and action planning 
(premotor regions) are engaged when reading a narrative that includes 
movement/navigation or interacting with objects respectively (Speer et al, 2009). 
Such evidence does not allow us to distinguish between strong and weak 
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embodiment given that weak embodiment would predict activation of primary 
sensory and motor cortices only for tasks requiring the integration of semantic 
representations (e.g. resolving ambiguities, sentence comprehension, narrative). 
It is plausible that primary areas are more engaged the closer semantic processing 
comes to mental imagery. Because of the thorny issue of where we draw the line 
between ‘semantic representation’ and other processes (such as building a situation 
model during narrative comprehension or generating conscious mental imagery), 
evidence of this type cannot unequivocally point to a strong version of embodiment.  
Kemmerer (2010) notes that there is a paucity of work that helps to separate 
semantic representations from those processed during actual perception and action, 
and those used during explicit imagery.  Preliminary data that addresses this 
distinction finds dissociations between action verb understanding and motor imagery.  
In strongly embodied views, simulation during semantic processing uses identical 
substrates to motor imagery (Gallese and Lakoff, 2005).  Willems et al (2009, 2010) 
posited that motor activations during semantic processing of motor verbs are pre-
enactments (simulation of future actions), in order to facilitate future action 
planning.  This is in line with the embodied view that comprehension of language 
links directly to action within in an environment (see also affordances, e.g. Glenberg 
& Kaschak, 2003).  In contrast, motor imagery is a more reflective process that 
involves covert enactment, requiring generation of an action plan and predictions 
about an action’s sensory consequences.  Willems et al (2009) compared neural 
activity during action verb processing (lexical decision) with explicit mental imagery 
of the same actions.  Actions were either manual (e.g. ‘grasp’) or non-manual (e.g. 
‘giggle’).  Results showed effector specific activation for both lexical decision and 
motor imagery in premotor areas, but activity in the primary motor cortex was only 
found for motor imagery.  Willems et al (2009) emphasize that (in light of the data) 
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embodied semantics must distinguish semantic processing from explicit mental 
imagery (see also van Elk et al, 2010, described in more detail below).  We fully 
support this conclusion. For those theories that subscribe to 'full simulation', there 
need to be clear statements about what counts as semantic processing and what 
distinguishes it from mental imagery and perception.  Barsalou (1999) distinguishes 
representation from imagery and perception by making simulations schematic and 
unconscious, however, it is not clear whether this still counts as simulation, or 
whether we might now think of this as accessing more abstract, categorised modal 
information that is more in line with weak embodiment. 
In all likelihood, the answer lies in looking at a continuum of processing ‘depth’ that 
depends on the task (e.g. lexical decision, sentence to picture comprehension, 
narrative and discourse understanding) rather than categorically delineating one 
process from another.   
 
Willems et al (2009, 2010) conclude that imagery and lexico-semantic activation 
serve different functions and therefore rely on different neural substrates.  Motor 
activation during semantic processing may serve predictive functions (in order to 
make communication effective) whereas explicit imagery may be reflective, occurring 
after a word has been at least partially understood.  Understanding action words 
engages regions involved in motor planning.  Imagery is reflective, and engages 
regions involved in motor planning as well as regions involved in motor execution.  
This focus on the function of the two processes is welcome.  For all tasks, we must 
ask – what purpose does it serve?  It cannot be stated strongly enough the 
importance of understanding how a task taps the process of interest, and where the 
effect of interest might arise.  Valid criticisms can be levelled at data taken to 
support embodiment because an interaction between conceptual/semantic and 
sensory-motor processing could arise from ‘simulation’, or from top-down effects on 
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attention and decision processes (Chatterjee, 2010; Mahon & Caramazze, 2008; 
Meteyard et al, 2008).  Similarly, in the imaging literature, careful consideration 
must be paid to (a) where activation occurs (see above re: the anterior shift); (b) 
what other activations occur – the presence of motor activations during the 
comprehension of motor language should not lead to other activations being 
sidelined as regards explanatory potential (Chatterjee, 2010); and (c) to what extent 
sensory-motor activation can be attributed to necessary & sufficient ‘simulation’ 
rather than, for example, individual variation in experience (e.g. Beilock et al, 2008).  
 
 
Individual Differences 
 
An interesting but important aside comes from recent evidence that shows how 
individual differences shape the nature of motor activations seen during 
comprehension tasks.  Willems et al (2010) explored how handedness influences 
motor activity during semantic processing of words referring to manual actions.  
They found that right handers activated the left premotor cortex during lexical 
decisions on manual actions, and left handers the right premotor areas. These 
results show that the motor component of manual-action verb semantics is body 
specific, and therefore shaped by actions one has performed (egocentric motor 
activity).  Similarly, Beilock et al (2008) and Lyons et al (2009) found that 
experienced players of ice-hockey showed greater activations in the left premotor 
cortex for sentence referring to hockey actions (e.g.  “The hockey player held onto 
the puck”) compared to non-hockey players, these differences were not present for 
everyday actions (e.g. “the individual closed the book”), for which both groups had 
similar levels of experience.  In sum, personal experience is an important influence 
on the nature and degree of motor activation observed during comprehension.  An 
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extension of this argument is that activation of one’s own motor system may not be 
essential for comprehension (we wouldn’t argue that non-hockey players couldn’t 
understand the described hockey actions) but a lesser degree of motor activity might 
suffice.   
 
Electrophysiology 
 
Predictions thus far have focused on the topography of the brain, looking for 
activations in regions known to process modality specific (i.e. sensory and/or motor) 
information when participants complete linguistic tasks.  These studies are open to 
the (valid) criticism of poor temporal resolution, such that activations represented by 
BOLD responses may reflect ‘post-lexical’ processing involved in mental imagery or 
strategic responses to the task (Toni et al, 2008).  Whilst it is not straightforward to 
make specific temporal predictions from embodied theories, one hypothesis produced 
from both strong and weak embodiment (and explainable by secondary embodiment) 
is that sensory and motor activity should occur early.  More specifically, it should 
occur within the time-frame that we know lexico-semantic processing occurs, as 
opposed to, say, phonological processing.  A recent paper has shed some light on the 
time-frames in question.  Sahin et al (2009) took intra-cranial recordings in Broca’s 
area during a word-production task (reading aloud, or producing a word within a 
sentence frame that demanded implicit or explicit inflection).  They found distinct 
sequential peaks in activity that corresponded to lexical retrieval (200ms), 
syntactic/inflectional processes (320ms) and phonological changes to the word 
(450ms).  From this study, we can say that the critical time period is therefore 
around 200ms post exposure to some target word.  A review of neurophysiological 
studies (EEG, MEG and TMS) exploring the motor content of action words found that 
activation of the motor cortex is significant at around this time-frame (e.g. 200-
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250ms) (Hauk, Shtyrov & Pulvermüller, 2008).  In addition, effects are not 
dependent on whether attention is focused on the motoric/action content of the 
stimuli, strengthening the conclusion that the activity is a necessary part of lexico-
semantic access (Hauk, Shtyrov & Pulvermüller, 2008).  
 
One recent study has begun to explore neurophysiological changes in some detail.  
van Elk et al (2010) took EEG recordings whilst participants read action sentences 
and occasionally made judgements about whether a presented target word was 
related to the sentence they had just read.  Critical sentences described animal 
actions (e.g. the deer jumps over the fence) or human actions (e.g. the athlete 
jumps over the hurdle) using the same verbs.  To stay on topic, we will focus on the 
early changes only (note that additional changes were observed for beta-frequency 
bands and the N400, linking early motor activity to linguistic parameters such as the 
cloze probability of the sentence constituents). They found changes in the mu-
frequency band from 160-520ms after verb onset that was focused over frontal and 
central scalp regions (source analysis localised this activity to the pre-central gyrus); 
critically preceding the N400 component classically related to semantic integration 
processes.  These early mu-frequency changes were stronger for verbs within an 
animal context as compared to a human context, not predicted by mental imagery 
accounts which might propose stronger activation for actions one is able to 
perform/imagine.  In contrast, the authors argued that this increased activity 
reflected stronger activation of motor information in order to understand actions that 
the listener cannot perform.  In addition, mu-frequency changes have previously 
been associated to action observation and execution, strengthening the argument 
that they reflected true motor activation during the comprehension of sentences 
describing actions (van Elk et al, 2010).   
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In sum, data from neurophysiological studies come out broadly in support of weak or 
strong embodiment, with early activation of motor regions.  To the best of our 
knowledge, data is only available for motor activations.  The study by van Elk et al 
(2010) begins to relate such motor activations to other parameters known to 
influence linguistic processing (e.g. cloze probabilities), and future studies would do 
well to do the same.  For example, what is the relationship between the spatial and 
temporal signatures of motor activations and lexical parameters such as frequency, 
concreteness, and familiarity?  Given that larger activations are seen for less 
frequent words (Sahin et al, 2009), will motor activations for action words that are 
lower in frequency also be greater, reflecting a relative increase in the difficulty of 
retrieval?  As with some of the imaging studies cited so far, and the patient studies 
discussed below, the issue of appropriate control items is critical here.  It is 
absolutely necessary to compare action verbs to non-action verbs, or verbs with 
different modal content (e.g. those referring to visual, haptic or auditory events).  
Only then can modality specific activations be truly attributed to embodied content.   
 
Patient Studies 
 
In parallel of what we have done above concerning imaging studies, we list here the 
predictions of the different theories and discuss the available patients’ evidence. Let 
us start by considering evidence from damage to sensory or motor systems. Strong 
embodiment predicts that deficits in sensory or motor systems will cause severe 
impairments (inability to complete the task, very high error rates) in processing 
words that refer to things with those sensory or motor attributes. Weak embodiment, 
instead, predicts that such impairments will not be severe but moderate (significantly 
more errors or longer reaction times). Finally, secondary/derived embodiment 
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predicts that deficits in sensory or motor systems will cause no impairments in 
processing words that refer to things with those sensory or motor attributes. Even 
allowing for some mild degree of impairment as a consequence of sensory and motor 
systems damage, this impairment will be significantly less than that seen when the 
semantic system ‘proper’ is damaged. 
The crucial data to support strong embodiment would come from studies reporting 
patients impaired in processing content specific lexical items (e.g. words referring to 
motor actions, or specific visual events such as motion, colour or shape) alongside 
an impairment in processing that particular sensory or motor content (e.g. executing 
motor actions, perceiving/recognising motion, colour or shape).  Crucially, the 
impairment must not extend to control words from other sensory-motor domains.   
At present such data does not exist. Nonetheless there are studies that have 
attempted to address this question, unfortunately, not providing clear evidence. 
Mahon and Caramazza (2007) studied patients with Ideational Apraxia. Following 
Warrington (REF), these patient would be specifically impaired in their ability to recall 
previously well-established actions, such as those involved in object use. The 
argument has been made that the study of Apraxia is informative as it helps to test 
whether motor production processes are critical in the conceptual representation of 
objects and actions.  Mahon and Caramazza asked their participants to use and 
recognize objects and to imitate and recognize pantomimes. They observed differing 
results at the group and single-case levels.  Single cases were analysed separately 
as group level analyses could mask single case dissociations that differ with the 
group pattern.   
 
At the group level (37 patients), positive correlations were found between object use 
and pantomime recognition, pantomime imitation and object recognition, thus 
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suggesting that the motor production processes engaged when using objects were 
also involved in recognizing those objects and their associated pantomimes 
(supporting embodiment). However, a variety of single-case disassociations were 
found in 19 out of the 37 patients.  For example, patients presented with impaired 
object use as compared to object recognition, and selectively impaired pantomime 
and action imitation. From this, the authors concluded that motor production 
processes engaged when using objects were not necessary for recognizing actions 
and objects (supporting un-embodied or secondary/derived embodiment).it is 
however the case that this data is not clear-cut and one could argue that indeed 
Ideational Apraxia cannot be informative context of embodiment because it is a high-
level (hence, presumably engaging the semantic system) motor impairment.  
Liepmann (1905) stated that Ideational Apraxia manifests when the patient had to 
formulate an “idea” of the movement, conceptualising the necessary actions and 
action sequences. The deficit might be attributable to a disorder at the level of 
access to knowledge about object use, failure to access a central motor programme 
or damage to the central programme itself (Heilman and Rothi, 1985). The variability 
in the performance of the patients reported by Mahon and Caramazza (2007) likely 
reflected the ambiguity between patients whose deficit did involve motor 
representations and those whose deficit did not.  
 
More revealing in deciding between strong, weak and secondary embodiment, in 
principle, could be studies of patient groups with direct damage to the motor system, 
such as Motor Neurone disease (MND), Fronto Temporal Dementia (FTP), Progressive 
Supra- nuclear Palsy (PSP) and Cortico-basal Degeneration (CBD). Motor Neurone 
Disease (MND) causes a variety of muscular problems, including weakness, wasting, 
fasciculations, dysphagia and dysarthria; it is associated with diffuse, mainly fronto-
temporal atrophy (Bak & Hodges, 2001).  Bak (2001) demonstrated that the 
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comprehension and production of verbs/actions was more impaired than that of 
nouns/objects, when compared to healthy individuals or those with Alzheimer’s. Post 
mortem analyses showed pathological changes in areas 44 (Broca’s area) and 45 for 
these patients, converging with other studies of verb/action processing (see Siri et 
al., 2008). Thus, although the presence of selective impairment for verbs/actions in 
these patients is consistent with strong and weak embodiment views; the anatomical 
data do not provide support for strong embodiment. It is the case, in fact, that the 
selective deficit can be easily accounted for in terms of differences in processing 
demands between nouns/objects and verbs/actions (Schnur et al., 2009; Vigliocco et 
al., 2006; Maetzig et al., 2009).  
 
Cotelli et al (2006) investigated object and action naming in several subtypes of 
Fronto-Temporal Dementia (FTD): Non-fluent Primary Progressive Aphasia (NfPPA, 
damage primarily in left frontal and perisylvian regions), Frontal variant of FTD 
(FvFTD, damage primarily in frontal regions bilaterally), and Semantic Dementia 
(SD, damage primarily in the anterior temporal lobes bilaterally) as well as 
Progressive Supranuclear Palsy (PSP, damage primarily in frontal regions, basal 
ganglia, cerebellum and brainstem) and Cortico-Basal Degeneration (CBD, damage 
primarily in frontal regions and the basal ganglia). Action naming impairments were 
observed in all of these pathologies with the exception of SD (in which atrophy is 
relatively confined to the anterior temporal regions), suggesting that damage to the 
frontoparietal-subcortical circuits involved in both action knowledge and 
representation leads to impairment in verb/action processing. These results support 
weak embodiment: damage to motor circuits leads to moderate impairment of 
action/verb processing. They do not provide evidence in favor of strong embodiment, 
according to which impairment should be of an ‘all or nothing’ style.  
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In a similar vein, Boulenger et al (2007) found that priming effects for action verbs 
in a lexical decision task varied as a function of levodopa uptake for Parkinsons’ 
Disease (PD) patients. During a masked priming task, where prime and target were 
identical except for letter case, PD patients showed greater priming for verbs when 
‘on’ medication that increased dopamine uptake as compared to ‘off’ medication; 
priming for concrete nouns did not differ according to medication phase (being 
strong in both cases).  The authors concluded that the motor system impairment 
present in PD selectively affects action verbs, in line with claims from strong and 
weak embodiment that the semantic processing of action verbs involves the motor 
system.  However, action verbs were compared to concrete nouns, rather than a set 
of matched ‘non-action’ verbs, confounding the effects with the broader noun versus 
verb distinction.  No studies have explored motor verbs (e.g. pinch, kick, kiss, climb, 
eat) against other events (e.g. sleep, drop, read, spin, rise) in these patients. This 
comparison is critical to decide whether the greater impairment for actions/verbs 
than objects/nouns is truly semantic. Verbs are generally more abstract and more 
complex to process than nouns due to their semantic, syntactic and morphological 
characteristics (e.g. Schnur et al., 2009; Vigliocco et al., 2006; Maetzig et al., 2009).  
Indeed, verb deficits in PD have been explained within this framework when 
exploring the role of the basal ganglia in language processing.  In particular, the 
basal ganglia may be involved in the controlled retrieval and selection of competing 
alternatives which would impact verbs more than nouns during lexico-semantic 
processing (Crescentini et al, 2008). 
 
Turning to sensory impairments, one study has assessed the performance of 
individuals with congenital blindness.  Embodiment proposes that category 
preferences (e.g. the differences between tools and animals) rely on relationships 
between conceptual domains and specific types of sensory and motor information 
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(e.g. tools rely on action and motion information, animals rely on visual information). 
Disembodied or secondary embodiment views would not make such a prediction 
assuming that categorical organization derives from other mechanisms (e.g., it is 
innately specified, see Mahon & Caramazza, 2009).In the study by Mahon and 
Caramazza (2009), congenitally blind and sighted participants performed size 
judgments on aurally presented words.  It was found that blind individuals activated 
the same brain regions as sighted individuals when performing these size judgments: 
namely regions on the ventral surface of occipital-temporal cortex. These findings led 
the authors to conclude that visual experience is irrelevant to establishing object 
representations.  However, the results can be interpreted as dependent upon 
experience: just a different type of experience. Moreover, whilst embodiment makes 
the prediction that representations depend on sensory and motor information, it does 
not follow that a system without one form of sensory input will organize in a 
completely different fashion.  Ventral stream organization, in particular the size 
knowledge required for the task, may have been based in other sensory dimensions 
such as tactile information, which is integrated into the ventral stream.  For example, 
Reed et al. (2009) found similar temporal activity for tactile and visual pattern 
recognition. The work of De Volder et al. (2001) also supports this idea. In their 
study, on the identification of a trigger sound, participants were instructed to 
retrieve a representation of the “visual” attributes of a stimulus (shape, size, 
configuration) which had been previously experienced during the training period by 
both auditory and haptic perception in early blind individuals and by both auditory 
and vision in sighted individuals. Activations were found in occipital and visual 
association areas, particularly in the left fusiform gyrus for both blind and sighted 
subjects. Thus, developmental cross-modal reorganization (in which sensory and 
motor experience plays a vital role) allows higher order processes to use the same 
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cortical regions. Thus, Mahon and Caramazza’s results came about because of an 
innate brain predisposition, cross-modal reorganization or both.  
It is important to keep in mind that this body of research does not directly address 
the question of whether sensory information is necessary for semantics.  It is not 
straightforward to predict that deprivation of one sensory modality from early in 
development will lead to a system of cortical organization that is essentially like the 
‘normal’ system minus that sensory input.  There is evidence that areas deprived of 
their typical sensory input are recruited for qualitatively different processes.  For 
example, Amedi (2004) found that repetitive TMS on the left occipital cortex of 
congenitally blind participants interfered with the generation of an ‘appropriate’ verb 
when given a noun; thus implicating the occipital cortex in semantic processing and 
lexical retrieval.  Therefore, we have evidence for similar neural organization (e.g. 
the ventral stream and fusiform activation for object judgments) and very different 
neural organization (as above) when we compare congenitally blind and sighted 
individuals. For these reasons, and more generally because there is not yet a clear 
model of how the brain develops when one kind of sensory input is removed, data 
obtained with patients deprived of a sensory channel from birth do not offer a clear 
testing ground for embodiment. More informative would be to consider cases in 
which individuals developed typical cognitive systems without impairments and then 
experienced some damage later in life; i.e. acquired conditions in adults.  
 
Having discussed the kind of data that is needed to decide between different strands 
of embodiment in semantics, it is necessary to respond to some of the criticisms that 
are leveled against embodiment itself.   
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Criticisms of embodiment  
Spreading Activation 
Mahon and Caramazza (2008) have argued that engagement of the sensory and 
motor systems in the brain [could] follow naturally from “activation cascades from 
disembodied concepts to the sensory and motor systems” (p.60, ibid).  Given this 
logical possibility, Mahon and Caramazza argued that the behavioural and 
neuroscientific findings that have so far been taken as evidence for the embodiment 
theories are, in fact, also consistent with disembodied theories. An example of such 
spreading activation, they argue, is found in phonological activation of unproduced 
words in a picture naming task (Morsella & Miozzo, 2002; Navarrete & Costa, 2005). 
They then extend this example to automatic activation of the motor system when 
participants name tools.  They conclude that activation cascades are ubiquitous in 
cognitive processes and therefore cannot be taken as evidence refuting the 
unembodied theories or confirming embodiment. 
However, we argue that this equivalence between phonological and motor activation 
is problematic: naming a picture of a hammer involves phonological activation of the 
word “hammer” (indirectly facilitating “hammock”, by similarity) but it clearly does 
not involve hammer use. So "spreading" of phonological similarity during 
phonological production is expected because production is part of the task. However, 
such spreading is not equivalent to spreading of activation to effector-specific motor 
units (e.g. the motor cortex enervating the hand muscles) that are not at all needed 
for performing the experimental task (i.e. picture naming). 
The implication is that the null hypothesis facing the predictions embodiment is that 
motor system is always activated in effector-specific patterns no matter what the 
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task requirement or the cognitive state of the observer may be. However, unless 
there is a non-trivial connection between naming and using (e.g. embodiment), there 
is no reason to believe that naming “hammer” should spread activation to the 
premotor cortex.  If the distinction between disembodied and embodied theories 
didn’t require that tool naming has something to do with tool use then arguing about 
the distinction between them would be meaningless. The non-specific spreading view 
is particularly problematic in explaining the disruption of semantic processing by 
application of TMS on motor cortex (Pulvermüller et al 2005). Here, the direction of 
the cascade has to be reversed from the motor system to the semantic 
representation and – what is more – the semantic concept should be triggered, 
specifically, by TMS-induced noise in the motor system (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008, 
p.62).  
Given the above, one may argue that Mahon and Caramazza’s criticism has widened 
the null hypothesis to such a degree that it encompasses both extremes. Such an 
unconstrained null hypothesis embraces any possible experimental result. 
 
What else contributes to semantics?  
For theories that adhere to secondary/derived embodiment, the default position is 
that semantic content is primarily abstract, with non-arbitrary connections to sensory 
and motor information.  For these theories, there still needs to be a clear statement 
of what, exactly, semantic content is.  For Patterson, Rogers and colleagues (Rogers 
et al, 2004; Patterson et al, 2008) the semantic system is defined by function, and 
organization, over content.  Since the semantic system is defined as a series of 
mappings between modality specific information, there appears to be an assumption 
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that content is provided by those modality specific systems, leaving it open to the 
same criticisms levelled at embodied theories: how do you account for abstract 
words?  For Mahon & Caramazza (2008), they assume that semantic content is 
abstract in nature, meaning that the content is essentially undefined.  
For theories that adhere to weak embodiment, two have recognised that other 
information contributes to semantic processing.  Simmons, Barsalou and colleagues 
(Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, Xiaoping & Barsalou, 2008; Barsalou, L.W., Santos, 
A., Simmons, W.K., Wilson, C.D. 2009) and Vigliocco and colleagues (Andrews, 
Vinson & Vigliocco, 2008; Vigliocco, Meteyard, Andrews & Kousta, 2009) have 
proposed that linguistic information in the form of word associations may play a role 
in lexico-semantic processing; alongside embodied content.  For Simmons, Barsalou 
et al, this is dependent on the task that is being performed; word-associations 
between linguistic forms (e.g. 'bird' and 'house') may be used when only shallow 
processing is necessary to complete a task (e.g. lexical decision with non-words that 
violate phonological or orthographic rules).  For them, real semantic content is still a 
simulation of sensory and motor information (e.g. Wu and Barsalou, 2009).  For 
Vigliocco et al, important aspects of word meaning are learnt and represented 
through their co-occurance (distribution) with other words; and affective information 
also plays an important role.  Under this description, the difference between concrete 
and abstract words lies in the preponderance of sensory and motor information for 
concrete words compared to a preponderance of linguistic and affective information 
for abstract words (Vigliocco, Meteyard, Andrews & Kousta, 2009).  
Finally, for strongly embodied theories, there is little or no mention of what else 
aside from sensory and motor information does contribute to lexico-semantic 
representation.    
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We take the position that sensory and motor information does not exhaust semantic 
content.  It is intuitive to adopt the the idea that central to semantic organization is 
the linkage of different kinds of information, and this has been achieved in 
connectionist or Bayesian models (e.g. Rogers et al, 2004; Andrews, Vinson & 
Vigliocco, 2008).  However, the key question remains, what is the information that is 
being linked.  This problem is especially salient when we look at abstract words. 
 
Abstract words 
A major problem for dominant embodied approaches is how to account for abstract 
cognition, such as that implicated in conceptual representation and abstract 
reasoning.  Embodied approaches do very well for on-line action between a body and 
an environment, and offer some intriguing explanations about how the environment 
is utilised to benefit cognition (Clark, 1997; Wilson, 2002). However, in order to 
maintain the embodied framework, simulation is at present the only mechanism that 
could support semantic and conceptual representations.  Simulation can provide the 
content of representation with perceptual and motor activity, but how the 
information is structured and processed is more problematic and less well defined, 
especially for abstract cognition (Barsalou, 1999).  One mechanism that has been 
put forward by Lakoff (1987) is that of conceptual methaphor. In this view, abstract 
domains are grounded into perception and ation via the mediation of concrete 
domains. Namely, abstract concepts such as love would be embodied because they 
would be learnt and represented as methaphorical extension from concrete concepts 
such as journey. These methaphors are clearly identifiable in languages and provide 
the mechanism by which abstract concepts could be embodied. It is however the 
case that evidence in favor to such a hypothesis is rather scant (but see e.g., 
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Glenberg, et al., 2008), moreover, it appears that even if possible such an account 
could not account for all abstract domains of knowledge (e.g., how much of the 
technical abstract jargon of our scientific knowledge could be characterized in this 
manner).  
We have recently put forward a theoretical account that goes beyond our previous 
work by accounting for the representaiton of abstract, in addition to concrete words 
(Vigliocco et al., 2009). In our current theoretical view we have argued for two 
classes of information that contribute to the representation of both concrete and 
abstract words: experiential (sensory, motor, but also affective) and linguistic 
(verbal associations arising through co-occurrence patterns and syntactic 
information). Differences between concrete and abstract word meanings (as well as 
within concrete and within abstract word meanings) arise as a result of the 
proportion and exact type of experiential and linguistic information from which they 
are derived. Most relevant for our purposes here, we have argued and provided 
evidence for a statistical preponderance for affective and linguistic information to 
underlie abstract word meanings (e.g., Kousta et al., 2009; Kousta et al., 
submitted).  Whereas concrete knowledge would be grounded into our experience 
with the outside world, abstract knowledge could be grounded in our internal 
experience. Abstract words tend, on the whole, to have more affective associations 
than concrete words, and the greater the affective associations, the earlier those 
abstract words are acquired (especially for positive words, Kousta et al., 2009). 
Thus, affect may play a critical role in allowing the learning, or bootstrapping, of 
abstract knowledge.  
Of course it is the case that not all abstract words are affectively loaded. Affect, 
nonetheless could have an important role in allowing for knowledge that cannot be 
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grounded to the external world to begin developing. Once the system is set in place, 
other abstract concepts can be learned, based on linguistic information solely.  
 
Grammar 
Finally, we turn to some of the most abstract elements of language. Thus far we 
have focused on the lexicon and the semantic information contained within content 
words.  However, languages have a variety of means of expressing other important 
elements of the world, such as the spatial information conveyed through prepositions 
(in English) and temporal and tense markers that vary aspect.  If embodied theories 
are to provide a unified account for semantic information, they need to be able to 
account for how these more abstract elements fit with access to sensory and motor 
information.  Whilst it is relatively intuitive to suggest that ‘simulation’ underlies the 
representation of concrete entities and events, it is rather less straightforward to 
explain how sensory and motor information can underpin the representation of 
information that is marked by morpho-syntactic changes.  This returns to a key facet 
of all languages: by expressing things in language we necessarily schematize and 
lose information. Language is a digital medium that uses features of meaning (such 
as agency, causation or spatial relations) which necessarily lose some of the richness 
and complexity of sensory experience (Pinker, 2007).  These features show how 
language carves the world up in a way that reflects our human experience, and by 
implication, any ‘simulation’ that underpins semantic processing should reflect this 
schematization.  This has been addressed in some incarnations of strongly embodied 
theories (e.g. Barsalou, 1999) by proposing that simulations are themselves 
schematic, but there has to be a more explicit treatment of morpho-syntactic 
information. 
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There is some preliminary work that addresses this area.  For spatial relations, as 
expressed by English prepositions, fMRI work has highlighted the left superior 
marginal gyrus and patient work has shown double dissociations between the 
processing of linguistic spatial relations and the performance of various visuo-spatial 
tasks (Kemmerer, 2010).  This implies, in line with weak embodiment or secondary 
embodiment, that areas proximal to – but not overlapping with - those that are 
involved in processing spatial information are involved in processing semantic 
information related to space.  For markers related to time, Zwaan (2008) provides a 
clear rationale for how mental simulations of sentences might change depending on 
different temporal markers (‘immediately’ versus ‘last year’), tense and aspect (e.g. 
progressive versus perfective).  The argument is that markers modify the content of 
simulations by making certain elements (and therefore certain modality specific 
information) more salient.  Bergen & Wheeler (2010) provide some preliminary 
evidence of this by demonstrating interactions between hand movements and 
sentences describing movements towards or away from the body for progressive 
aspect sentences (‘Ashley is stretching her arms’) but not for perfective aspect 
sentences (‘Ashley had stretched her arms’).  The authors argue that grammatical 
markers for aspect operate over the simulated content to shift the focus of attention 
to, for example, a motor movement (thereby accessing motor content) or to a 
completed action (thereby accessing more visual information) (Zwaan, 2008).  
This work begins to address the challenge to embodied theories posed by the 
meaningful consequences of morpho-syntactic information.  Stating that such 
information modifies simulations of semantic content is a reasonable addition to 
strongly embodied theories.  The fact that access to modality specific information 
appears to be highly flexible and dependent on the linguistic context can be 
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accommodated by all points on the continuum of embodied theory.  However, to 
return to the point made earlier, there is much in language that is schematic and 
abstract, which begs the question of whether a fully analogue system (as proposed 
by strong embodiment) is necessary or sufficient for semantic processing. 
 
 
Conlcusions: converging on convergence zones 
There is broad agreement amongst the theories we have reviewed that some form of 
convergence zones are central to semantic representation.  This is based on the 
assumption that in order to represent something, we must be able to retrieve a 
collection of sufficient information that stands for that thing.  This information is 
stored neurally as statistical regularities, feature conjunctions or correlations.  
Convergence zones are regions of cortex that can be shown to store such 
information (e.g. through a change in bold response when a semantic 
representation/concept is processed).  Neurophysiological work supports the 
proposal that modality specific content it is necessary for semantic representation by 
demonstrating that it appears early in linguistic processing. There is also an 
increasing body of work that demonstrates a gradient of ‘abstraction’: as one moves 
away from primary sensory and motor cortices, more complex conjunctions are 
captured.  This supports the idea of convergence zones as the basis for 
representation (explicitly predicted in Damasio’s original framework, Damasio, 1989; 
Damasio & Damasio, 1994), particularly when more anterior activations are present 
when something is recognized (i.e. categorized within extant semantic 
representations).  We find ourselves supporting a position where primary sensory 
and motor regions are not activated during routine semantic processing (in 
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opposition to strong embodiment) but may be so for deeper processing related to 
imagery. 
Theories differ as to how they define the location and modal content of the zones.  
Those within weak embodiment state that these convergence zones are multi-modal, 
distributed across the cortex and located proximal to sensory and motor regions.  
Those theories within secondary embodiment state that there is (probably) one 
major convergence zone (i.e. it is unitary) and it is located separately to sensory and 
motor regions.  According to weak embodiment, we should not see semantic 
processing without activation of these modal zones; according to secondary 
embodiment, we should be able to achieve semantic processing only with the 
activation of the unitary, major zone (modal activations are not necessary, but may 
be present). 
We have taken the position that fully symbolic, unembodied theories can be rejected 
and that the validity of strong embodiment is questionable outside conscious 
imagery.  There is broad agreement that sensory and motor information is activated 
when a semantic representation is accessed.  Differences remain as to what 
constitutes ‘true’ semantic information that is necessary and sufficient for 
representation, rather than secondary to it.  An important caveat here is the task 
that is used to access semantic information; different tasks may implicate different 
configurations of semantic information.  This will likely prove to be a particularly 
thorny problem, and will require explicit theoretical statements about what is ‘true’ 
semantic information, and careful consideration of what level of processing an 
experimental task requires.  Part of this work must explore the representation of 
abstract words, defining how more or less abstract content is realized, relate 
sensory-motor processing in linguistic tasks to known linguistic variables (like 
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frequency) and begin to tackle the schematic information laid down by morpho-
syntactic markers. 
We have provided predictions and discussed the kind of data that will allow extant 
theories to be separated, or integrated.  Finally, we have discussed the remaining 
theoretical problems, that theories of semantics need to account for.  We hope that 
this paper serves as a useful starting point for further research in the field.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46
 
References 
 
Acres, K. The organisation of the ventral temporal object processing stream. 
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Cambridge, Pembroke College, 
2008. 
 
Amedi, A., Floel, A., Knetch, S., Zohary, E. and Cohen, L.G. Transcranial magnetic 
stimulation of the occipital pole interferes with verbal processing in blind subjects. 
Nature neuroscience, 7(11): 1266-1270, 2004.  
 
Andrews, M., Vinson, D., Vigliocco, G. Integrating experiental and distributional data 
to learn semantic representations. Psychological Review, 116 (3): 463-498, 2009. 
 
Bak, T.H. & Hodges, J. R. Motor neurone disease, dementia and aphasia: 
coincidence, co-occurrence or continuum? Journal of Neurology, 248 : 260–270, 
2001. 
 
Bak, T.H., O’Donoval, D.G., Xuereb, J.H., Boniface, S. and Hodges, J.R. Selective 
impairment of verb processing associated with pathological changes in Brodmann 
areas 44 and 45 and the motor neurone disease-dementia-aphasia syndrome. Brain, 
124: 103-120, 2001. 
 
Bar, M., Tootell, R. B. H., Schacter, D. L., Greve, D. N., Fischl, B., Mendola, J. D., 
Rosen, B.R., Dale, A.M. Cortical mechanisms specific to explicit visual object 
recognition. Neuron, 29 (2): 529- 535, 2001. 
Barense, M.D., Bussey, T.J., Lee, A.C.H., Rogers, T.T., Davies, R.R., Saksida, L.M.,  
Murray, E.A., Graham, K.S. Functional Specialization in the Human Medial Temporal 
Lobe. The Journal of Neuroscience, 25 (44): 10239-10246, 2005.  
Barsalou, L.W., Santos, A., Simmons, W.K., Wilson, C.D. Language and simulation in 
conceptual processing. In: De Vega, M., Glenberg, A.M., Graesser, A. (Eds.), 
Symbols, Embodiment, and Meaning. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009. 
 47
Bedny M, Caramazza A, Grossman E, Pascual-Leone A, Saxe R. Concepts are more 
than percepts: the case of action verbs. Journal of Neuroscience, 28 (44): 11347-
11353, 2008. 
Beilock, S.L., Lyons, I.M., Mattarella-Micke, A., Nusbaum, H.C. & Small, S.L. Sports 
experience changes the neural processing of action language. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 105: 13269-13273, 2008. 
 
Bergen, B. & Wheeler, K. Grammatical aspect and mental simulation. Brain and 
Language, 112: 150-158. 2010. 
 
Boulenger, V., Mechtouff, L., Thobois, S., Broussolle, E., Jeannerod, M., Nazir, T.A. 
Word processing in Parkinson’s disease is impaired for action verbs but 
not for concrete nouns. Neuropsychologia, 46(2): 743-756. 2007 
 
Bright, P., Moss, H., Tyler, L.K. Unitary vs multiple semantics: PET studies of word 
and picture processing. Brain and Language, 89 (3): 417-432, 2004. 
 
Caramazza, A. Hillis, A.E., Rapp, B.C., Romani, C. The multiple semantics 
hypothesis: Multiple confusions? Cognitive Neuropsychology, 7 (3): 161-189, 1990.  
 
Caramazza, A. and Mahon, B.Z. The organization of conceptual knowledge: the 
evidence from category-specific semantic deficits. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
7(8): 354-361, 2003. 
Chatterjee, A. The neural organization of spatial thought and language. Seminars in 
Speech and Language, 29: 226-238, 2008. 
 
Chatterjee, A. Disembodying cognition. Language and Cognition, 2-1: 79-116, 2010. 
 
Clark, A. Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again. London, UK.: 
MIT Press, 1998.  
 
Collins, A. M., Loftus, E. F. A Spreading-Activation Theory of Semantic Processing. 
Psychological Review, 82 (6): 407-428, 1975.  
 
 48
Corbett, F., Jefferies, E., Ehsan, S., Lambon Ralph, M.A. Different impairments of 
semantic cognition in semantic dementia and semantic aphasia: evidence from the 
non-verbal domain. Brain. 132 (Pt 9): 2593-2608, 2009. 
Cotelli, M., Manenti, R., Cappa, S.F., Geroldi, C., Zanetti, O., Rossini, P.M., Miniussi, 
C. Effect of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation on Action Naming in Patients With 
Alzheimer Disease. Arch Neurol, 63: 1602- 1604, 2006. 
 
Crescentini, C., Mondolo, F., Biasutti, E. & Shallice, T.  Supervisory and Routine 
Processes in Noun and Verb Generation in Nondemented Patients with Parkinson’s 
Disease. Neuropsychologia, 46(2): 434–447, 2008. 
 
Damasio, A.R. The Brain Binds Entities and Events by Multiregional Activation from 
Convergence Zones. Neural Computation, 1, 123-132, 1989. 
 
Damasio, A.R. & Damasio, H. Cortical Systems for Retrieval of Concrete Knowledge: 
The Convergance Zone Framework. Ch. 4 in C. Koch & Davis, J.L. (Eds) Large-Scale 
Neuronal Theories of the Brain, MIT Press, London, UK, 1994. 
 
De Volder, A.G., Toyama, H., Kimura, Y., Kiyosawa, M., Nakano, H., Vanlierde, A., 
Wanet-Defalque, M.C., Mishina, M., Oda, K., Ishiwata, K., Senda, M. Auditory 
Triggered Mental Imagery of Shape Involves Visual Association Areas in Early Blind 
Humans. Neuroroimage, 14: 129-139, 2001. 
 
Devlin JT, Russell RP, Davis MH, Price CJ, Wilson J, Moss HE, et al. Susceptibility-
induced loss of signal: Comparing PET and fMRI on a semantic task. Neuroimage 11: 
589–600, 2000. 
 
Farah, M. J., McClelland, J. L. A Computational Model of Semantic Impairment: 
Modality Specificity and Emergent Category Specificity. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 120 (4): 339-357, 1991.  
 
Fodor, J. A. The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology. London: MIT 
Press, 1983.  
 
Frith, C. Making up the mind: How the Brain Creates our Mental World. Oxford, UK.: 
Blackwell, 2007. 
 49
 
Gallese, V., Lakoff, G. The brain's concepts: The role of the sensory-motor system in 
conceptual knowledge. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22 (3/4): 455- 479, 2005. 
 
Glenberg, A. M., Kaschak, M. P. The body's contribution to language. In B.H.Ross 
(Ed.), The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 43: 93-126. San Diego, CA: 
Academic Press, 2003. 
 
Glenberg, A. M., Robertson, D. A. Symbol Grounding and Meaning: A Comparison of 
High-Dimensional and Embodied Theories of Meaning. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 43: 379-401, 2000. 
 
Glenberg, A. M., Sato, M., Cattaneo, L. Use-induced motor plasticity affects the 
processing of abstract and concrete language.  Current Biology, 18, R290-R291, 
2008. 
 
Rothi, L.J., Heilman, K.M., Watson, R.T. Pantomime comprehension and ideomotor 
apraxia. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Pyschiatry, 48 (3): 207-210, 1985.  
 
Hauk, O., Shtyrov, Y. & Pulvermuller, F. The time course of action and action-word 
comprehension in the human brain as revealed by neurophysiology.  Journal of 
Physiology – Paris, 102: 50-58, 2008. 
 
Jackendoff, R. Foundations of Language:  Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution 
(Large format paperback ed.): Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
Jefferies E, Patterson K, Jones RW, Lambon Ralph MA. Comprehension of concrete 
and abstract words in semantic dementia. Neuropsychology, 4: 492-9, 2009. 
Johnson- Frey, S. H. The neural bases of complex tool use in humans. TRENDS in 
Cognitive Sciences, 8 (2): 71-78, 2004.  
 
Johnson-Laird, P. The computer and the mind: An introduction to Cognitive Science. 
Glasgow: Fontana Press, 1993. 
 
 50
Kemmerer, D. Visual and motor features of the meanings of action verbs: A cognitive 
neuroscience perspective. In:  Roberto G. de Almeida & Christina Manouilidou (Eds.) 
Verb concepts: Cognitive science perspectives on verb representation and 
processing. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, to appear. 
Kemmerer, D. How words capture visual experience: The perspective from cognitive 
neuroscience. In B. Malt & P. Wolff (Eds) Words and the Mind: How words capture 
human experience, Ch14: 289-329. Oxford University Press, 2010. 
 
Kossyln, S.M., Thompson, W.L., Kim, I.J., Alpert, N.M. Topographical 
Representations of Mental Images in Primary Visual Cortex, in M.S. Gazzaniga (Ed) 
Cognitive Neuroscience: A Reader. Blackwell, Oxford: 202-208, 2000. 
 
Kousta, S.-T., dellaRosa, P., Vinson, D.P., Cappa, S.F., Devlin, J. & Vigliocco, G. The 
neural representation of abstract word processing, submitted. 
 
Kousta, S.-T., Vinson, D.P. & Vigliocco, G. The role of emotional valence in the 
processing of words. Cognition, 112, 473-481, 2009. 
 
Lakoff, G. Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What categories reveal about the 
mind. Chicago, IL.: University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
 
Landauer, T. K., Dumais, S. T. A Solution to Plato's Problem: The Latent Semantic 
Analysis Theory of Acquisition, Induction and Representation of Knowledge. 
Psychological Review, 104 (2): 211-240, 1997. 
 
Lambon Ralph MA, Graham K, Patterson K, Hodges J. Is a picture worth a thousand 
words? Evidence from concept definitions by patients with semantic dementia. Brain 
and Language, 70 (3): 309-35, 1999. 
 
Lerner, Y., Hendler, T., Ben-Bashat, D., Harel, M., Malach, R. A hierarchical axis of 
object processing stages in the human visual cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 11 (4): 287-
297, 2001. 
 
Levelt, W. J. M. Speaking: From Intention to Articulation. London, England.: MIT 
Press, 1989. 
 51
 
Liepmann, H. Der weitere Krankheitsverlauf bei dem einseitig Apraktischen und der 
Gehirnbefund auf Grund von Serienschnitten. Monatsschrift fur Psychiatrie und 
Neurologie, 17: 283-311, 1905. 
 
Lyons, I.M., Mattarella-Micke, A., Cieslak, M., Nusbaum, H.C., Small, S.L. & Beilock, 
S.L. The role of personal experience in the neural processing of action-related 
language. Brain and Language, 112(3): 214-22, 2009. 
 
 
Maetzig, S., Druks, J., Masterson, J., & Vigliocco, G. Object vs. action naming: A 
double dissociation? Cortex, 45, 738-758, 2009. 
Mahon, B.Z., Anzaellotti, S., Schwarzbach, J., Zampini, M., Caramazza, A. Category-
Specific Organization in the Human Brain Does Not Require Visual Experience. 
Neuron, 63: 397-405, 2009. 
 
Mahon, B. Z., Caramazza, A. A Critical Look at the Embodied Cognition Hypothesis 
and a New Proposal for Grounding Conceptual Content. Journal of Physiology-Paris, 
102 (1-3): 59-70, 2008. 
 
Martin, A. The Representation of Object Concepts in the Brain. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 58: 25-45, 2007. 
 
Martin, A., Wiggs, C.L., Ungerleider, L.G., Haxby, J.V. Neural correlates of category-
specific knowledge. Nature, 379: 649-652, 1996. 
 
Morsella & Miozzo. Evidence for a cascade model of lexical access. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 555-563, 2002. 
 
Murray, E. A., Bussey, T. J. Perceptual-mnemonic functions of the perirhinal cortex. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3 (4):142-151, 1999. 
 
McRae, K., de Sa, V. R., Seidenberg, M. S. On the Nature and Scope of Featural 
Representations of Word Meaning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
126(2): 99-130, 1997. 
 
 52
Navarrete & Costa, Phonological activation of ignored pictures: further evidence for a 
cascade model of lexical access. Journal of memory and language, 53, 359-377, 
2005. 
 
Negri, G.A.L., Rumiatti, R.I., Zadini, A., Ukmar, M., Mahon, B.Z. and Caramazza, A. 
What is the role of motor simulation in action and object recognition? Evidence from 
apraxia. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 24 (8): 795-816, 2007. 
 
Newell, A. Physical Symbol Systems. Cognitive Science, 4, 135-183, 1980. 
 
Newell, A., Simon, H. A. Human Problem Solving. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1972.  
 
Paivio, A. Imagery and verbal processes. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971. 
 
Paivio, A. Mental Representations: A Dual-Coding Approach. Oxford Psychology 
Series, 9. 1986. 
 
Patterson, K., Nestor, P.J.,Rogers, T.T. Where do you know what you know? The 
representation of semantic knowledge in the human brain. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience 8: 976-987, 2007. 
 
Pinker, S. The Stuff of Thought: Language as a window into human nature. Penguin 
Group: London, 2007. 
 
Plaut, D. C. Graded modality-specific specialisation in semantics: A computational 
account of optic aphasia. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 19, 603–639, 2002. 
 
Pobric, G., Lambon-Ralph, M., Jefferies, E. The role of the anterior temporal lobes in 
the comprehension of concrete and abstract words: rTMS evidence. Cortex, 45: 
1104-1110, 2009. 
Pulvermüller, F., Harle, M., Hummel, F. Walking or Talking? Behavioral and 
Neurophysiological Correlates of Action Verb Processing. Brain and Language, 78:  
143-168, 2001. 
 
 53
Pulvermüller, F., Hauk, O., Nikulin, V., Ilmoneimi, R.J. Functional interaction of 
language and action: a TMS study. European Journal of Neuroscience, 21, 793-797, 
2005. 
 
Pulvermüller, F. Words in the brain's language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22: 
253-336, 1999. 
 
Pylyshyn, Z. W. Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive 
Science (2nd ed.). London, England.: MIT Press, 1985. 
 
 
Rapp, B.C., Hillis, A.E., Caramazza, A. The role of representations in cognitive 
theory: more or multiple semantics and the agnosias. Cognitive neuropsychology, 10 
(3): 235-249, 1993. 
 
Rogers, T. T., Lambon Ralph, M. A., Garrard, P., Bozeat, S., McClelland, J. L., 
Hodges, J. R., Patterson, K. Structure and Deterioration of Semantic Memory: A 
Neuropsychological and Computational Investigation. Psychological Review, 111 (1): 
205-235, 2004. 
 
 
Sahin, N., Pinker, S. Cash, S.S. Schomer, D. & Halgren, E. Sequential Processing of 
Lexical, Grammatical, and Phonological Information Within Broca’s Area. Science, 
326: 445-449 
 
Schnur TT, Schwartz MF, Kimberg DY, Hirshorn E, Coslett HB, Thompson-Schill SL. 
Localizing interference during naming: convergent neuroimaging and 
neuropsychological evidence for the function of Broca's area. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Science U.S.A, 106 (1): 322-327, 2009. 
Schwarzbauer C, Mildner T, Heinke W, Brett M, Deichmann R. Dual echo EPI--the 
method of choice for fMRI in the presence of magnetic field inhomogeneities? 
Neuroimage. 49 (1): 316-26, 2010. 
 54
Searle, J. Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 417-457, 
1980.  
 
Seitz, A. R., Watanabe, T. Is subliminal learning really passive? Nature, 422 
(6927):36-36, 2003. 
 
Simmons, K.W., Barsalou, L.W. The similarity-in-topography principle: Reconciling 
theories of conceptual deficits. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 20 (3/4/5/6): 451-486, 
2003.  
 
Simmons, W.K., Hamann, S.B., Harenski, C.N., Hu, X.P., Barsalou, L.W. fMRI 
evidence for word association and situated simulation in conceptual processing. 
Journal of Physiology – Paris, 102: 106-119, 2008.  
Simmons, W.K. & Martin, A. The anterior temporal lobes and the functional 
architecture of semantic memory. Journal of the International Neuropsychological 
Society, 15(5): 645-9. 2009. 
Simon, H. A. Information Processing Models of Cognition. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 30:363-396, 1979. 
 
Siri, S., Tettamanti, M., Cappa, S. Della Rosa, P., Saccuman, C., Scifo, P. & Vigliocco, 
G. The neural substrate of naming events. Cerebral Cortex, 18: 171-177, 2008. 
 
Smith, E. E., Shoben, E. J., Rips, L. J. Structure and Process in Semantic Memory: A 
featural model for semantic decisions. Psychological Review, 81 (3): 214-241, 1974.  
 
Speer, N.K, Reynolds, J.R., Swallow, K.M., Zacks, J.M. Reading Stories Activates 
Neural Representations of Visual and Motor Experiences. Psychological Science, 20 
(8): 989-999, 2009. 
 
Thompson-Schill, S.L. Neuroimaging studies of semantic memory: inferring “how” 
from “where”. Neuropsychologia, 41: 280-292, 2003. 
 
Toni, I., de Lange, F. P., Noordzij, M. L., & Hagoort, P. Language beyond 
action. Journal of Physiology Paris, 102(1-3), 71-79, 2008. 
 55
 
Tyler, L.K., Moss, H.E. Towards a distributed account of conceptual knowledge. 
Trends in Cognitive Science, 5 (6): 244-252, 2001. 
 
Tyler, L. K., Stamatakis, E. A., Bright, P., Acres, K., Abdallah, S., Rodd, J.M. & Moss, 
H.E. Processing Objects at Different Levels of Specificity. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 16(3): Pages 351-362, 2004. 
  
 
Taylor, K.I., Stamatakis, E.A. & Tyler, L.K. Crossmodal integration of object features: 
Voxel-based correlations in brain-damaged patients. Brain. 132(3): 671-683, 2009. 
 
Quillian, M. R. Semantic Memory. In M. Minsky (Ed.), Semantic Information 
Processing, 216-271. London, England.: MIT Press, 1968. 
 
van Elk, M., van Schie, H.T., Zwaan, R.A., Bekkering, H. The functional role of motor 
activation in language processing: motor cortical oscillations support lexical-semantic 
retrieval. Neuroimage, 50(2):665-77, 2010. 
 
Vigliocco, G., Meteyard, L., Andrews, M., Kousta, S. Towards a theory of semantic 
representation. Language and cognition, 1 (2): 219-247, 2009. 
 
Vigliocco, G., Vinson, D. P., Lewis, W., Garrett, M. F. Representing the meaning of 
object and action words: The featural and unitary semantic space hypothesis. 
Cognitive Psychology, 48: 422-488, 2004. 
 
Vigliocco, G., Warren, J., Siri, S., Arciuli, J., Scott, S., & Wise, R. The role of 
semantics and grammatical class in the neural representation of words. Cerebral 
Cortex, 16: 1790-1796, 2006. 
 
Wallentin, M., Ellegaard, T., Ostergaard, S., Ostergaard, L., Roepstorff, A. Motion 
verb sentences activate left posterior middle temporal cortex despite static context. 
NeuroReport, 16 (6): 649-652, 2005. 
 
 56
Warrington, E.K., Shallice, T. Category specific semantic impairments. Brain, 107 (Pt 
3): 829-854, 1984.  
 
Willems R.M., Hagoort, P., Casasanto, D. Body-specific representations of action 
verbs: neural evidence from right- and left-handers. Psychological Science. 21:67-
74. 2010. 
 
Willems R.M., Toni, I., Hagoort, P., Casasanto, D. Neural Dissociations between 
Action Verb Understanding and Motor Imagery. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
2009. 
 
Wilson, M. Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 9 (4): 
625-636, 2002. 
 
Wu, L.L, Barsalou, L.W. Perceptual simulation in conceptual combination: Evidence 
from property generation. Acta Psychologica, 132: 173-189, 2009. 
 
Zwaan, R. Time in Language, Situation Models and Mental Simulation. Language 
Learning, 58(s1):  13-26. 2008. 
 
Zwaan, R., B.H.Ross. The immersed experiencer: toward an embodied theory of 
language comprehension. In The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 44: 35-62. 
San Diego, CA.: Academic Press, 2004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 57
 
 
 
Figure 1: 
 
